« 『思想地図β vol.1 』 | トップページ | 『R.O.D』 »

Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 2010

Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letters 2010

2010年のハイライトはBurlington Northern Santa Fe (BNSF)の買収。
鉄道は環境に優しく、社会に利益をもたらす。。

When traffic travels by rail, society benefits.

2011年は80億ドルを資本支出(買収)に使う予定、うち20億ドルはアメリカ。
不確実性という言葉に惑わされるな。

The prophets of doom have overlooked the all-important factor that is certain: Human potential
is far from exhausted, and the American system for unleashing that potential – a system that has worked wonders for over two centuries despite frequent interruptions for recessions and even a Civil War – remains alive and effective.

Berkshireの本質的価値を構成する3要素
1. 株・債券・現金同等物への投資
2. 投資・保険引受以外の収益:Berkshireの株価は長期的に投資と収益に比例する。

Over time, you can expect our stock price to move in rough tandem with Berkshire’s investments and earnings. Market price and intrinsic value often follow very different paths – sometimes for extended periods – but eventually they meet.

3. 留保収益が将来生む利益(留保1ドルあたり収益)

Berkshireはプロセスより人を信じる。

Our trust is in people rather than process. A “hire well, manage little” code suits both them and me.

会社の文化は自己増殖する。常に注意を怠らないこと。

Cultures self-propagate. Winston Churchill once said, “You shape your houses and then they shape you.” That wisdom applies to businesses as well. Bureaucratic procedures beget more bureaucracy, and imperial corporate palaces induce imperious behavior. (As one wag put it, “You know you’re no longer CEO when you get in the back seat of your car and it doesn’t move.”) At Berkshire’s “World Headquarters” our annual rent is $270,212. Moreover, the home-office investment in furniture, art, Coke dispenser, lunch room, high-tech equipment – you name it – totals $301,363. As long as Charlie and I treat your money as if it were our own, Berkshire’s managers are likely to be careful with it as well.

「資産の半分を失ったのに、妻がまだ残っている」というジョークが流行った。

As one investor said in 2009: “This is worse than divorce. I’ve lost half my net worth – and I still have my wife.”

2010年にput売で$647milプレミアムを受け取り、反対売買で$425mil支払った。結果$222milの利益を実現し、かつ金利のかからない$647milを3年間使うことができる。

「純利益」はBerkshireには意味がない。

it is almost always meaningless at Berkshire.
Regardless of how our businesses might be doing, Charlie and I could – quite legally – cause net income in any given period to be almost any number we would like.

ブラックショールズ式はオプションに不適当な価格をつける。本当の価格はBS式より安いはず。

As a p.s., I can’t resist pointing out just how capricious reported net income can be. Had our equity puts had atermination date of June 30, 2010, we would have been required to pay $6.4 billion to our counterparties at that date. Security prices then generally rose in the next quarter, a move that brought the corresponding figure down to $5.8 billion on September 30th. Yet the Black-Scholes formula that we use in valuing these contracts required us to increase our balance-sheet liability during this period from $8.9 billion to $9.6 billion, a change that, after the effect of tax accruals, reduced our net income for the quarter by $455 million.
Both Charlie and I believe that Black-Scholes produces wildly inappropriate values when applied to long-dated options. We set out one absurd example in these pages two years ago. More tangibly, we put our money where our mouth was by entering into our equity put contracts. By doing so, we implicitly asserted that the Black-Scholes calculations used by our counterparties or their customers were faulty.
We continue, nevertheless, to use that formula in presenting our financial statements. Black-Scholes is the accepted standard for option valuation – almost all leading business schools teach it – and we would be accused of shoddy accounting if we deviated from it. Moreover, we would present our auditors with an insurmountable problem were we to do that: They have clients who are our counterparties and who use Black-Scholes values for the same contracts we hold. It would be impossible for our auditors to attest to the accuracy of both their values and ours were the two far apart.
Part of the appeal of Black-Scholes to auditors and regulators is that it produces a precise number. Charlie and I can’t supply one of those. We believe the true liability of our contracts to be far lower than that calculated by Black-Scholes, but we can’t come up with an exact figure – anymore than we can come up with a precise value for GEICO, BNSF, or for Berkshire Hathaway itself. Our inability to pinpoint a number doesn’t bother us: We would rather be approximately right than precisely wrong.

企業の生き残りのためには流動性を確保すること。

[My grandfather] Ernest never went to business school – he never in fact finished high school – but he understood the importance of liquidity as a condition for assured survival.

「みんなやっている」は理由にならない。

Sometimes your associates will say “Everybody else is doing it.” This rationale is almost always a bad one if it is the main justification for a business action. It is totally unacceptable when evaluating a moral decision. Whenever somebody offers that phrase as a rationale, in effect they are saying that they can’t come up with a good reason. If anyone gives this explanation, tell them to try using it with a reporter or a judge and see how far it gets them.

規則よりも、マネジメントがどのように振る舞うかが、事業の発展に大きく影響する。

Your attitude on such matters, expressed by behavior as well as words, will be the most important factor in how the culture of your business develops. Culture, more than rule books, determines how an organization behaves.

|

« 『思想地図β vol.1 』 | トップページ | 『R.O.D』 »

コメント

コメントを書く



(ウェブ上には掲載しません)




トラックバック


この記事へのトラックバック一覧です: Berkshire Hathaway Shareholder Letter 2010:

« 『思想地図β vol.1 』 | トップページ | 『R.O.D』 »